@Book{689846282,
author="Dluhosch, Barbara
and Horgos, Daniel",
title="(When) does tit-for-tat diplomacy in trade policy pay off?",
series="Diskussionspapier 116",
year="2012",
publisher="HSU Univ. d. Bundeswehr",
address="Hamburg",
abstract="In international relations, short-run incentives for non-cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of selfenforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on contingent protection aka tit-for-tat in trade policy. By highlighting various strategies in a (linear) partial-equilibrium framework, we show that retaliation of noncooperative behavior by limiting market access works as a disciplining device independently of supply and demand parameters. Our theoretical results are backed by empirical evidence that countries more frequently involved in WTO-mediated disputes entailing tit-for-tat strategies pursue on average more liberal trade regimes. -- Int. Political Economy ; Trade Policy Conflicts ; Tit-for-Tat ; WTO Dispute Settlement",
note="Barbara Dluhosch; Daniel Horgos",
note="Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.",
url="https://d-nb.info/1021364568/34",
url="http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-29702",
url="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71099",
url="http://www.hsu-hh.de/fgvwl/index_jxtg3c5J2svNui1O.html",
language="English"
}