@Book{586162429,
author="Thomas, Tobias",
title="Questionable luxury taxes: results from a mating game",
series="Diskussionspapier 86",
year="2008",
publisher="HSU Univ. d. Bundeswehr",
address="Hamburg",
keywords="Luxusg{\"u}ter; Verbrauchsteuer; Konsumentenverhalten; Nachfrageinterdependenz; Signalling; Spieltheorie; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Theorie",
abstract="This contribution provides a game theoretical derivation of market demand as a function of the level and distribution of income in the considered economy: if (i) the price is low, everyone buys the good; if (ii ) the price is high, only the rich buy the good (a status good in a narrow sense). If (iii) the price is located in very high or in middle range, demand collapses. With this, we explain the critical price from which a status good acts as a distinctive signal. In addition, this approach shows the potential welfare-improving impact of conspicuous consumption. Taking these results into account, recommendations by numerous economists to prevent the welfare losses of conspicuous consumption by introducing a luxury tax are highly questionable. -- luxury tax ; conspicuous consumption ; mating model ; signaling game ; status good",
note="Tobias Thomas",
note="Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.",
url="https://d-nb.info/998044318/34",
url="http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-17176",
url="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38721",
language="English"
}