TY  - BOOK
AU  - Kraus, Daniel Sebastian
PY  - 2013
DA  - 2013//
TI  - Devices to screen borrowers' privately known default risk
KW  - Kreditgeschäft
KW  - Asymmetrische Information
KW  - Finanzintermediation
AB  - Chapter 1 theoretically shows why lenders ration loan size and loan applicants to screen borrowers' riskiness in a competitive spot loan market with imperfect information. Chapter 2 theoretically examines how lenders can reduce costs to screen borrowers' riskiness by a commitment to grant a loan in the future and including a material adverse change (MAC) clause while a spot loan market co-exists. Chapter 3 empirically tests how borrowers' impatience can be used to screen their private information about default risk.
UR  - http://rosdok.uni-rostock.de/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:de:gbv:28-diss2015-0213-4
UR  - http://rosdok.uni-rostock.de/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:de:gbv:28-diss2015-0213-4&pdf
UR  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:28-diss2015-0213-4
LA  - English
N1  - eingereicht von Daniel Sebastian Kraus
ID  - 844212091
ER  -