%0 Book
%T Devices to screen borrowers' privately known default risk
%A Kraus, Daniel Sebastian
%D 2013
%G English
%F 844212091
%O eingereicht von Daniel Sebastian Kraus
%O Rostock, Univ., Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. Fak., Diss., 2014
%X Chapter 1 theoretically shows why lenders ration loan size and loan applicants to screen borrowers' riskiness in a competitive spot loan market with imperfect information. Chapter 2 theoretically examines how lenders can reduce costs to screen borrowers' riskiness by a commitment to grant a loan in the future and including a material adverse change (MAC) clause while a spot loan market co-exists. Chapter 3 empirically tests how borrowers' impatience can be used to screen their private information about default risk.
%L 332.74
%K Kreditgeschäft
%K Asymmetrische Information
%K Finanzintermediation
%9 theses
%9 Text
%9 Hochschulschrift
%U http://rosdok.uni-rostock.de/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:de:gbv:28-diss2015-0213-4
%U http://rosdok.uni-rostock.de/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:de:gbv:28-diss2015-0213-4&pdf
%U http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:28-diss2015-0213-4