@Book{844212091,
author="Kraus, Daniel Sebastian",
title="Devices to screen borrowers' privately known default risk",
year="2013",
keywords="Kreditgesch{\"a}ft; Asymmetrische Information; Finanzintermediation",
abstract="Chapter 1 theoretically shows why lenders ration loan size and loan applicants to screen borrowers' riskiness in a competitive spot loan market with imperfect information. Chapter 2 theoretically examines how lenders can reduce costs to screen borrowers' riskiness by a commitment to grant a loan in the future and including a material adverse change (MAC) clause while a spot loan market co-exists. Chapter 3 empirically tests how borrowers' impatience can be used to screen their private information about default risk.",
note="eingereicht von Daniel Sebastian Kraus",
note="Rostock, Univ., Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. Fak., Diss., 2014",
url="http://rosdok.uni-rostock.de/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:de:gbv:28-diss2015-0213-4",
url="http://rosdok.uni-rostock.de/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:de:gbv:28-diss2015-0213-4&pdf",
url="http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:28-diss2015-0213-4",
language="English"
}